The tragedy of Baga
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| soldiers with their jackboots and guns in Baga after the 2013 massacre |
The
fishing community of Baga by Lake Chad in Borno state was under siege for a
week at the beginning of January. Amnesty
International described the ensuing bloodbath as the “deadliest massacre” by Boko Haram, estimating that some 2,000
persons were killed. President Jonathan, who condemned the “dastardly terrorist
attack” against Charlie Hebdo cartoonists
within hours of the tragic event in Paris, did not say a word about this
tragedy.
The
attacks on Baga and over 16 towns and villages in its Local Government Area
started on January 3. The insurgents overran the headquarters of the
Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) of the Chadian, Nigerien and Nigerian
armies. Fleeing soldiers, men, women and children from Baga were pursued into
the villages and bushes, killed and buildings set ablaze.
Baga
and its environs have become ghost towns in the aftermath of the assault. The
dead were left unburied, as “bodies lay strewn” on the streets according to
widely circulated eyewitness accounts. About 35,000 people have been displaced.
Most of these are now in camps at Maiduguri and Monguno in Borno state,
including 3,200 registered by the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA)
just last weekend. Kalzeubet Pahimi Deubet, the Prime Minister of Chad also
announced that 2,500 Nigerians and 500 Chadians fleeing from Baga have sought
refuge in the country. Subsequently Boko
Haram fighters launched attacks into Chad but were repelled.
Not
all those trying to escape to Chad made it there alive. Several died as fragile
canoes they packed themselves in capsized. Over 500 were trapped on the many
“mosquito-infested islands” dotting Lake Chad. Quite a number of the refugees
in cramped camps died from starvation, poor shelter and malaria.
The
response of the federal government and its cronies has been offensively
insensitive. It started with lies. The Chief of Defence Staff, Air Chief
Marshal Alex Badeh initially denied that the MNJTF’s base had been seized and
residents killed. News Express, a conservative
paper also reported on January 5 that Boko
Haram had been decisively dealt with in the clashes at Baga. And on January
10, Dr. Doyin Okupe, a senior aide of the president described the reported
death toll as exaggerated in a tweet.
For
a week, the Defence Headquarters said it could not confirm the number of
casualties. Subsequently, Brigadier Chris Olukolade the army spokesman stated
that the total number of people killed in the bloodbath, including soldiers was
“just” 150 persons. It did not stop at that. He attempted to wipe the slate of
blood from the guns of soldiers in 2013, with the current massacre. According
to him, this “confirms” that insurgents and not soldiers were responsible for
the 2013 massacre, which the army denied
ever happened.
Baga
is in many ways a metaphor of the war in the north east. The lies and hypocrisy
of the Nigerian state and Western governments, the equal culpability of the
army and Boko Haram in shedding blood
of poor working people and signposts of changing moments in this bitter war,
are critical examples.
This
is the second massacre in Baga. On April 16, 2013, Boko Haram fighters killed a soldier during a shootout in the town
which had to a great extent come under the sect’s control by 2012. The soldiers
reinforced, returning en masse with
armoured personnel carriers. Survivors reported that for several days, they
shot indiscriminately and torched all houses in sight (one cannot but recall
similar retaliatory massacres in Odi (1999) and Zaki Biam (2001) after irate
youths killed security personnel). The town was then locked down, with
journalists and activists denied access to verify what actually happened.
The
army claimed then that “only” 6 civilians were killed, while soldiers killed 30
Boko Haram militants. It also denied
that houses were razed to the ground. But satellite images showed that over
2,000 houses were burnt down. Verifiable evidence also confirmed that not less
than 200 civilians were killed. Brigadier General Olukolade described everyone
who did not believe the army’s cock and bull story as sympathisers of Boko Haram.
The
United States government condemned that massacre and called for the army to
respect human rights. These were empty words with which it played to the gallery
of global outcry. The Federal Government
also announced that it would conduct what it described as a “full scale
investigation” into the “allegation” of massacre. Nothing has come out of this.
The
2013 Baga massacre set the stage for the declaration of a state of emergency in
the three north eastern states of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe, on May 14. But the
spate of carnage in the north east (and other parts of the north) has worsened
with the state of emergency. More people have been killed in the past 20 months
than those killed in the 4 years preceding emergency rule. Kidnapping took on
added steam. The case of the “Chibok girls” drew international attention before
the presidency spoke on it 3 weeks after the abduction. And #BringBackOurGirls
campaigners have been harassed and demonized by the government.
By
August 2014, partly inspired by ISIS, Boko
Haram declared Gwoza a caliphate, seizing swathes of territory in the
states under state of emergency. The recent Baga massacre took place in a
context where the sect controls 70% of the landmass of Borno encompassing two
thirds of the state’s Local Government Areas. It has equally organised prison
breaks in places far away from Borno as Kogi in the north central. The Federal
Government informed the world that it had reached a ceasefire agreement after
secret negotiations with (a faction of) Boko
Haram in October. Less than 24 hours after this, the insurgents attacked Maikadiri
and Shaffa, in two different Borno state LGAs. This raised fears that the war
cannot end through negotiations with the “terrorists”.
But
a military solution equally appears utopian, not the least because of
collaboration between sections of the ruling class and the sect. The low morale
of ill-equipped and underpaid rank and file soldiers also contributes to the
cul-de-sac of this option. Instead of addressing their legitimate fears which
have led to desertions and protests, the state has sentenced 66 of them to
death, for mutiny. The question for working people, particularly those trapped
in the warzone of the north east remains, “what is to be done?”
Inkling
of the answer to this question can be gleaned in the phenomenon of the Civilian
JTF (CJTF). The state (governments, army and other security agencies) cannot be
relied upon to salvage the situation. On the contrary, it is part of the
problem, utilising institutional terror against non-militant residents and the Boko Haram Jihadists alike. The security
services for example killed about as many people as Boko Haram has since the war started, according to credible reports
from both local and national NGOs.
The
CJTF’s armed resistance has to a very great extent routed Boko Haram from Maiduguri. Similar and aligned groups to it have
played central roles in pitched battles were some of the towns seized by the
sect were reclaimed, albeit temporarily. But the CJTF cannot but be a shadow of
the armed independent self-activity of the working masses in the region
required to reclaim its soul, for two related reasons.
First
is its class composition. It is made up largely of unemployed lumpen “area” youths. Second is its relationship
with the state. While it was formed independently (in the sense of spontaneously) in April 2013, its name
would suggest some sense of affiliation to the state’s Joint Task Force which
has now been disbanded and replaced with the army’s 7th Infantry
Division. The CJTF’s leadership presently reports to the General Officer
Commanding the division. Quite contentious as well is the employment of CJTF
militants by state governments’ agencies, such as the Borno State Youth
Empowerment Scheme (BOYES).
The
missing link is leadership by the organised working class. With the stature of
the unions in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states, a more active involvement of the
trade unions in the resistance would help sharpen the class lines of the armed
resistance. There are legitimate fears by union leaders at both state council
and shop floor levels that this could make working class activists targets of
the sect. But already, hundreds of union members are known to have been killed
in the line of duty in the zone. particularly teachers and health workers. We
cannot allow ourselves to be cowed. Indeed, some of the boldest union leaders I
have ever met are in this war torn region. Even in this trying period, several
have taken commendable risks in the ongoing multifaceted struggle.
The
trade union leadership nationally needs to take much more decisive actions, not
only to inspire working class activists in the region but because the tragedy
of war in the north east is a tragedy for the working people as a whole. Beyond
the fact that the insurgency has spread well beyond the north east whereit
rages like wildfire, an injury to one is definitely an injury to all.
Apart
from condemnation of attacks by Boko
Haram and support for military action against it on several occasions, the
trade unions do not appear to have a robust position on the war, which grasps
the evolution of the sect and its insurgency, the current and worsening
situation in the region, and the tasks for the working class nationally and in
the zone in combating the twin terrorisms of Boko Haram and the Nigerian state. The forthcoming national delegates’
conference of the Nigeria Labour Congress presents an opportunity to address
this.
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